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CASE NUMBER: 20080776-SC
In the
Utah Supreme Court

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
Jose Baltarcar Roybal,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Respondent

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On July 25, 2008, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling in this case.
That ruling is published as State v. Roybal, 2008 UT App 286, 191 P.3d 822. On
November 25, 2008, the Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated §78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant's girlfriend called 911 to report a domestic disturbance. She told
the dispatcher that the Defendant had left the premise in his car and that he had
"just about" assaulted her.

Defendant's girlfriend identified herself and the

Defendant by name, and said Defendant had been drinking, but gave no further
1

information. When an officer spotted the Defendant in the area, the Defendant was
driving slowly, but violating no traffic laws. The Court of Appeals held that the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

Issue I: Was the Court of Appeals correct in concluding that there was no
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed domestic violence, where
the only information given to a 911 dispatcher was that the Defendant had "just
about" assaulted her?

Issue II: Was the Court of Appeals correct when it analyzed the 911 call separately
from the officer's observations when conducting its reasonable suspicion analysis?
In addition, was the Court of Appeals correct when it concluded that there was no
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was driving while intoxicated?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On certiorari, we review the decision of the Court of Appeals and not that
of the district court. The Court of Appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness.
In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to either the court of appeals or
the district court regarding the application of law to underlying factual findings."
State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61, f 8, 147 P.3d 425 (quotations and citation omitted).

# # €
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 14.
warrant.]

[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for dangerous weapon —
Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk
the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person
is in danger.

§78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FACTS
On August 8, 2005, Annalee McCain called 911 and told the dispatcher that
she had a dispute with her live-in boyfriend. R. 96:1. Annalee told the dispatcher
that uthe person that's been living with me is an a

and I want him the f— out

of here." R. 96: 1. When the dispatcher asked her whether she had been assaulted,
Annalee responded "just about yes," but then further affirmed that her boyfriend
had not actually assaulted her. R: 96:2 When questioned, "And he hasn't assaulted
you?" Annalee's response was "No."
The dispatcher had asked Annalee whether her boyfriend "had been
drinking?" R. 96:2, and Annalee replied: "We both have. And you might have to
take both of. I don't even give a s—, I just want him out." R. 96:2. Annalee was
excited and angered. The dispatcher then attempted to calm Annalee down, telling
her to "take a couple of deep breaths." R. 96: 2. The trial court later stated that
Annalee sounded intoxicated during the call. R. 95:24.
Annalee gave the dispatcher her name and address. R. 96:1. She identified
the Defendant as her boyfriend and gave the dispatcher Defendant's name, age,
and ethnicity. R. 96:2-3. Annalee told the dispatcher that Defendant was no longer
in the house and that he was "putting stuff in his van" and was "leaving." R. 96: 23. Annalee then explained the vehicle the Defendant was getting into and gave
&

•

«
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only a partial license plate number. R. 96: 3-4. She then told the dispatcher what
road Defendant was traveling on. R. 96:3. No further inquiries about the amount
of alcohol consumed or other details were requested.
The 911 dispatcher sent out a bulletin requesting the assistance of officers.
R. 54. Sergeant Chad Ledford responded. R. 54. The 911 dispatcher informed him
that a "male and female were verbally fighting, no weapons, both parties very
intoxicated." R. 54. The dispatcher identified Defendant and gave the make and
color of his vehicle, as well as Defendant's direction of travel. R. 54. The
dispatcher then indicated that Defendant was "1055," police code for intoxicated
driver. R. 54, 97:4.
After receiving the 911 dispatch, Sergeant Ledford was traveling eastbound
on 30th Street, towards Annalee's residence1. R. 97:5. As Sergeant Ledford passed
Brinker Ave., he noticed Defendant's van approached the stop sign at Brinker and
30th. R. 97:5. Although there was no oncoming traffic, Defendant sat there for "a
few seconds" before turning right onto 30th, but was violating no traffic laws. R.
97:7. When Defendant turned the comer and started coming towards Sergeant

1

The State has included a Google map of the area and asks that this Court take
judicial notice of that information. The Defendant stipulates to the judicial notice
nature of the map. It is interesting to note that the officer is, however, mistaken as
to directions based on the map. The officer stated that he was traveling eastbound
on 30th street toward Annalee's residence when he saw the Defendant at the
intersection of Brinker and 30th. If this was the case, he would have been traveling
away from Annalee's residence which was five blocks west of Brinker.

Ledford, he was traveling at about 5 - 2 5 mph in a 35 mph zone. R. 95: 3: 97:6.
Sergeant Ledford was stopped at the stop light at the intersection of 30th and
Harrison Blvd. and watched as Defendant approached him from the rear. R. 97: 56. It appeared to Sergeant Ledford that Defendant was "hoping the red light would
change." R. 97:7. The Defendant pulled up next to Sergeant Ledford, stopped at
the red light, and sat at the red light. R. 97:6. Defendant made a right turn onto
Harrison Blvd. R. 97:6. Sergeant Ledford followed. R. 95:12.
The speed limit on Harrison Boulevard was 40 mph, but Defendant was
traveling slower. R. 95:3; 97:6. Defendant then turned onto Patterson Avenue. R.
97:6. Sergeant Ledford thought it looked as if Defendant was trying to avoid him.
R. 97:7. Sergeant Ledford could not testify as to the speed limit on Patterson, nor
the mph that Defendant was driving. Sergeant Ledford only said the speed was "a
little slow" or a a little odd." R. 95:3, 14.
Sergeant Ledford stated that his experience shows that individuals who have
been drinking their fine motor skills are affected so overall movements are slower
and they may try to avoid police cars. R. 97:10. Sergeant Ledford suspected
Defendant was impaired because he had observed the Defendant driving "a little
slow," and Defendant did not try to drive next to Sergeant Ledford. R. 97:9.
Sergeant Ledford also suspected that Defendant had committed domestic
violence. R. 95:14-16. From the dispatch report, Sergeant Ledford knew there had
# t. ^
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been a domestic dispute. R. 97:2. Sergeant Ledford stated that it is "normal
behavior for people involved in those types of relationships to argue." R. 97:14. As
a result, department policy required Sergeant Ledford to interview both the victim
and suspect on any domestic violence call. R. 97:2-3.
Sergeant Ledford pulled Defendant over on the 1100 block of Patterson". R.
95:2. Sergeant Ledford's primary reason for stopping Defendant was to investigate
the domestic dispute. R. 97:17-18. Only later did Sergeant Ledford state he stopped
the Defendant to investigate him for a DUI. R. 97: 21-22. After Defendant failed
field-sobriety tests, he was arrested for DUI. R. 95:4-9.

Trial Court Proceedings
On August 29, 2005, Defendant was charged with one count of DUI and one
count of violating a no alcohol conditional license. R. 1. Defendant filed a motion
to suppress all evidence derived from the stop, arguing that the stop was not
supported by reasonable suspicion that he had committed any crime. R. 23-24.
The trial court denied Defendant's motion. R. 56-59. In the court's oral
ruling, the court concluded that the stop was justified because the 911 dispatcher
had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving while under the influence of
" It is also interesting to note that Sgt. Ledford claimed the defendant had been
driving in a slow, circuitous pattern in the vicinity of Annalee's residence.(R. 97:
8-9) The fact of the matter is that the distance between the residence of 3865
Quincy to the 1100 block of Patterson is over 12 block, or one and one half miles
away. (See map with locations marked addendum A)
# f: «s
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alcohol. R. 95:23-25. As a result, the court did not decide whether there was
reasonable suspicion of a DUI based on the officer's own observations of
Defendant's driving behavior, or whether Sergeant Ledford had reasonable
suspicion that Defendant had committed domestic violence.
On July 19, 2006, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, preserving his right
to appeal the district court's ruling. R. 66-67.

Defendant was sentenced on

October 5, 2006, and timely appealed. R. 85-87.
Court of Appeals Ruling
On July 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals reversed State v. Roybal, 2008 UT
App 286, 191 P.3d 822. The Court first held that Annalee McCaine's 911 call was
less reliable because Annalee was Defendant's angered girlfriend. Id. The court
held "when a citizen-informant has some kind of personal involvement with the
suspect, the information conveyed is considered less reliable because there is a
possibility that the citizen is making allegations out of anger, jealousy, or for other
personal reasons." Id. at ^ 11.
The Court held that Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was driving while intoxicated. Id at f 14-16. Defendant's girlfriend was
extremely upset with Defendant as expressed by her words to the 911 dispatcher,
the girlfriend never told the 911 dispatcher "the quantity or type of alcohol
# % €
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[Defendant]

consumed/' "how long [Defendant] had been drinking/' or

Defendant's weight. Id. at f 14.
The court also decided that Sergeant Ledford's observations alone did not
justify the stop. Id. at % 10. The court held that there was no "suggestion of
criminality" because Defendant had not actually violated any traffic laws. Id. at ^j
16.
The Court also held that Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable suspicion
that Defendant had committed domestic violence. The Court held that Annalee's
call to 911 only described a "nonphysical confrontation" that could not support an
investigatory stop. Id. at ^f 17.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I;

The Defendant submits that Sergeant Ledford did not have

articulable reasonable suspicion to stop and seize the Defendant based upon the
911 call from Annalee. The Defendant recognizes the standard to be utilized in a
stop and seizure is an objective review of the totality of the circumstances. The
only evidence available for this review is the 911 tape where Annalee claimed that
Roybal had "just about assaulted" her, but upon further inquiry verified that he had
not in fact assaulted her. She also mentioned that Roybal had been drinking, but
did not elaborate on what he had been drinking, how much, and in what time
& &«
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period it had been consumed. There was also significant anger and rage on the part
of Annalee during the call which would affect a reasonable person's reliance on
that information. Taken at its best, the 911 call indicated a verbal argument, with
no physical aspect, and an individual who was driving away after having consumed
an uncertain amount of an unspecified beverage. There was no question that
Annalee was not in danger since it was confirmed that Roybal had left the
premises. Given the totality of the circumstances, the stop therefore violated the
Defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights.
Point II:

Likewise, the Defendant does not believe that the State has

established reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant based upon an unverifiable
claim of driving while intoxicated. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. In regards to traffic stops, this has been
interpreted to require reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped has
committed an offense.

In the present case, Sergeant Ledford had no objective

reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed any crime. In fact, the
following of the Defendant for almost four blocks and viewing absolutely no
driving violation should have dispelled suspicion in a reasonable objective mind.
Given the totality of circumstances test, a reasonable objective officer would not
have believed that there was suspicion that the Defendant had or was committing a
crime.

Furthermore, the officer could not have reasonably believed that the
# t €
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Defendant was heading back to Annalee's home based upon objective facts that he
had left the premises, that he was over 1 lA miles away from the home, and that he
was driving slowly and cautiously and therefore not in any kind of rage of anger.
The seizure, therefore, constitutes a violation of the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights.

ARGUMENT
A founding father of this great nation, Benjamin Franklin, poignantly stated,
"Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety." Historical Review of Pennsylvania, 1759, It has
long been valued and expressed in our Constitution through the Bill of Rights, that
individuals are entitled to protections against their government. United States
Constitution Art. I Sec. 14, Fourth Amendment; Utah Const. Art. I, §14. The cost
of our independence was great; it did not come easily. As the Declaration of
Independence states:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. ... That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it... Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient
causes..." Declaration of Independence, 1776. (emphasis added)
# # €
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Abraham Lincoln, perhaps expressed it best in his address to the New Jersey
State Senate on February 21, 1861. In speaking to the Senate he briefly recalled
reading about George Washington's crossing of the ice-choked Delaware in the
dead of winter during the Revolutionary war and then stated,
I recollect thinking then, boy even though I was, that there must have
been something more than common that those men struggled for; that
something even more than National Independence; that something that
held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to
come; I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and
the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the
original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be most
happy indeed if I shall be an humble instrument in the hands of the
Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people, for perpetuating the
object of that great struggle.
One of those liberties that President Lincoln so cherished was the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. As the Constitution
provides, and as this Court further declared in State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 10, 999
P.2d 7, "A stop is justified only if there is a reasonable suspicion that a person is
involved in criminal activity." This court recognizing that an unjustified stop is a
violation of a person's protected and essential right to liberty and freedom from
illegal searches. Id.
It is important to uphold these rights our country was founded upon.
Allowing individuals to be stopped without reliable information simply on an
officer's unsupported suspicion violates the very right our Constitution was
enacted to protect. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Sergeant

12

Ledford did not have independent probable cause to suspect Defendant was driving
intoxicated or that Defendant had been involved in a domestic dispute. (Roybal).
Further, the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding a standard of reliable
informants when the court held that allegations, as received from Defendant's
girlfriend, who expressed angry language towards Defendant to the 911 dispatcher;
and considering the nature of the situation, did not rise to a level of reasonable
suspicion without further information. State v. Roybal, 2008 UT App 286 ^jl 1, 14.,
191 P.3d 822 Although the Court of Appeals did not articulate the objective
standard and the totality of circumstances, it is evident that their ruling was
consistent with those rules.
ISSUE I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
WHERE
THE
ONLY
INFORMATION GIVEN TO A 911 DISPATCHER WAS
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD "JUST ABOUT"
ASSAULTED HER.

The State argues that the 911 call should have been presumed reliable for
two reasons. First, the caller identified herself to the 911 dispatcher, and therefore
should be presumed reliable. Second, it should be presumed reliable because it was
a 911 emergency call. (Brief. Pet. pg 17) However, if accepted, these "rules"
would result in an increase of unreliable informants and increased 911 calls that

13

were not substantiated by objective observances of officers. In addition, an
individual's essential liberty would be deprived because any person who was mad,
upset, jealous or plain mean would have the power to call 911 and launch a false
complaint that would then be the sole reason for a stop and seizure.
A.

Identified citizen-informants should still be subject to an objective
standard of reliability.
It is well established that "a police officer may detain and question an

individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person
has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v.Markland, 2005
UT 26, ^[10, 112 P.3d 507. In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an
officer must only have "some minimal level of objective justification for making
the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence." Alabama v. Write, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). Courts
accordingly look to the "totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether
the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal
wrongdoing." United States v. Ai"vizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
In State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104 Tj 18, 48 P.3d 872, this Court held that when
evaluating tips, "reliability and veracity are generally assumed" when the tip
comes from "a citizen who receives nothing from the police" in exchange for the
information. Id. There are generally two categories of tips that do not enjoy the
presumption of reliability. First, courts do not presume that a tip is reliable when it

TV

comes from a police informant who has gained the "information through criminal
activity" or who is "motivated by pecuniary gain." State v. McArthur, 200 UT App
23, % 31. Second, tips that come from anonymous sources are subjected to further
analysis, and must therefore be supported by particular indicia of reliability in
order to support reasonable suspicion. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). Both of
these exceptions arise from a probability of ulterior motives for the call. It is
precisely this probability of ulterior motive that arose in the present case with an
angry, vindictive caller who used abusive names toward the Defendant.
In State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 12, ^ 14, 999 P.2d 7, the Court concluded that the
dispatch was based on articulable facts to justify the stop through the informant's
tip. Id. The Court stated, "all the State must introduce is evidence showing the
informant's tip was reliable, provided sufficient detail of criminal activity, and
could be corroborated by police." Id.
In Kohl, the informant's tip was reliable because the informant provided
information about whom to stop, including the make and color of the vehicles and
the number of suspects, but also indicated why the stop was to be made. See State
v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1278 (Utah App. 1994) ("Merely providing descriptive
information to an officer about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the
stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop was to be
made."). In addition, in Kohl, more importantly, the police personally confirmed
# # m
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the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip first by direct contact with French, the
victim, and thereafter by finding several males and vehicles matching French's
description, including the driver of the green truck, who confirmed critical
elements of the description given in person by French to officers. The court held
that the officers' stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and affirmed the trial
court's ruling. Id.
The present case can be distinguished from Kohl. In Kohl, the informant
gave information not only regarding the defendants and their vehicle description,
but also gave a reason why a stop should be made. Here, Annalee never made a
statement that she thought the Defendant was drunk or that he should be stopped
for being intoxicated. She further indicated that he had never assaulted her. The
court in State v. Case, 884 P.2d at 1278 (UT. App. 1994) explicitly said that mere
description is not enough. Annalee gave nothing more than a description. No
further facts were asked to confirm whether Defendant was intoxicated or not. This
type of information should be considered unreliable.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), stated
that a an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
irrelevant to the existence of probably cause. Id. see also Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996) and Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). The same
court stated that "[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
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application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend
upon the subjective state of the officer." Id. see Horton v. California 496 U.S. 128
(1990)
Utah has similarly followed that same standard. In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Utah,1986) this Court held:
The validity of the probable cause determination is made from the
objective standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer
... guided by his experience and training." (citing United States v.
Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir.1972))
The U.S. Supreme Court as wrell as Utah courts have made it clear that an
arresting officer's state of mind (except for facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the
existence of probable cause. Id. Meaning, that an officer's subjective reason for
making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts
provide probable cause.
In the present case, Sergeant Ledford had no objective articulable reason for
stopping the Defendant. The reasoning behind stopping the Defendant was not
objective, it was subjective. Defendant's girlfriend called 911, stated that no crime
had actually occurred, stated that the Defendant may have had something to drink,
but does not specify how much, how long ago, or how much the Defendant
weighed. The inforaiation received from the 911 call does not substantiate any
specific crime. Next, Sergeant Ledford states that Defendant was driving
#
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cautiously and that no traffic laws were being violated. This type of driving is what
society encourages. Then with no objective reasoning, relying on only his hunch,
Sergeant Ledford stopped the Defendant. This is a violation of Defendant's rights
and contrary to the objective standard rule applied, upheld nationally and locally.
Utah courts have also held that a relationship of the informant to the
defendant also plays a role in the reliability of the tip. In Salt Lake City v. Bench,
2008 UT App 30, % 16, 177 P.3d 655, Certiorari Denied by Salt Lake City v.
Bench, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah Jul 11, 2008) the court held that an ex-wife's "veracity
was questionable," even though "nothing...suggested that she actually harbored
any ill will" toward her ex-husband. Id.
In Bench {Id. at ^f 16), the Court made it clear that certain citizen-informants
are less reliable. In Bench, his ex-wife was an identified citizen-informant. The city
argued that she was a reliable source of information. Because a citizen-informant
"volunteers] information out of concern for the community and not for personal
benefit," Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and because "the
informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil prosecution if the report is
false," Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), a tip from an identified
citizen-informant is generally considered "highly reliable." City of St. George v.
Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah.App.1997), cert, denied, St. George v. Carter, 953
P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). See

Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah
% m <«
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App.,1997) ("An identified 'citizen-informant' is high on the reliability scale[.]")
(citation omitted).
In Bench, the court held:
[T]here are circumstances where a citizen-informant's veracity may
properly be called into question. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229, 1233 (Utah 1996) ("[PJolice expressed some question of [an
informant]'s veracity due to a bias she may have harbored toward her
ex-paramour."); State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah CtApp.1993)
(recognizing that ex-wife's allegations that defendant was high on
cocaine and had been involved in a domestic disturbance earlier in the
day were of "questionable reliability"); United States v. Phillips, 727
F.2d 392, 393-94, 398 (5th Cir.1984) (noting that evidence informant
was defendant's estranged wife, who had recently quarreled with and
left her husband, "may have cast doubt on her trustworthiness");
United States v. Hodges, 705 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir.1983) (discussing
veracity of defendant's former live-in girlfriend who perhaps
"harbored ill will toward" him); Louisiana v. Morris, AAA So.2d 1200,
1204 (La. 1984) (discussing veracity of informant who, involved in a
custody dispute with his wife, may have wanted to give "a false report
to embarrass or inconvenience" her); Minnesota v. Lindquist, 295
Minn. 398, 205 N.W.2d 333, 335 (1973) ("[A] prior relationship with
a suspect might give an informer motive to lie or exaggerate.");
Montana v. Olson, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297, 303 (2003)
(observing that evidence of a "strained relationship" between
informant and his defendant wife, who had separated from him, may
indicate that the informant had mixed motives). Such a concern is
surely presented here, given that the citizen-informant was Bench's
ex-wife and that malice or ill will is a typical-albeit not inevitableproduct of divorce." Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, % 15,
177 P.3d 655, Certiorari Denied by Salt Lake City v. Bench, 199 P.3d
367 (Utah Jul 11,2008)
%•
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The present case is similar to Bench, Here Annalee was upset with the
Defendant and even told the dispatcher "I don't even give a s—, I just want him
out." R. 96:2. Annalee was excited and angered. The dispatcher then attempted to
calm Annalee down, telling her to "take a couple of deep breaths." R. 96: 2. These
types of words and expressions require that a dispatcher get more information to
make the infonnant more reliable and support the claims made. The informant is
not completely unreliable, but the dispatcher and officer are required to get further
corroborating evidence to justify a stop.
The Bench court went on to say that had the ex-wife provided more detail,
which Bench's ex-wife was in a position to provide, that would have gone a long
way in satisfying the concerns implicated by her questionable reliability as his exwife.
Likewise, Annalee McCain was in a position to tell the dispatcher more
information. Annalee could have explained the amount of alcohol the Defendant
had been drinking, when he had been drinking, his weight and other information
that would have made her a more reliable infonnant and provided objective
information to justify the stop. That additional inquiry was simply not made.
The State wants this Court to believe that allowing the Roybal decision and
the Bench decision to stand, will place family members and spouses in the same
class as criminals and anonymous callers in regards to informants who do not
20

enjoy the presumption of reliability. (States brief pg 13,) That fear does not
logically follow the Court's decision in Roybal If this Court is to follow its longstanding policy of applying an objective standard to an officer's reasons for a stop
and seizure, it needs to be applied uniformly across the board. Both the State and
the Amicus brief seem to ask this Court to allow a dispatcher to disregard the
context in which a particular 911 complaint is made if it is from a woman caller in
a domestic situation. Carving out an exception for a domestic call undermines the
very foundation of the objective standard this Court has set forth. Furthermore,
requiring farther information from a 911 caller does not unreasonably deter the
calling of 911 by bona fide victims. In fact, reason would dictate that requesting
more information by the dispatcher in a 911 call would reassure a victim of the
police's sincerity in following up on the allegations and protecting the caller.
The State cites the case of Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984), in
which a defendant's girlfriend called the police and told them about stolen goods.
Id at 729. The girlfriend had admitted she they were broken up and wanted
defendant to bum. Id. The Supreme Court held this call supported the search
warrant saying the recent breakup provided motive for furnishing the information.
Id. at 734. The Court further upheld the search and the tip of the informant because
it was supported by other corroborating evidence and much detail by the exgirlfriend. Id. The lieutenant, in that case, after getting information from the
# & ^
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informant ex-girlfriend, then went to the location of the motor home, began filling
out a search warrant and named specific items that had been described by the exgirlfriend. Id. The arrest of the defendant in Upton was supported by objective
reasons for arrest,(the allegation of stolen goods) while in Roybal only the officer
and dispatcher's subjective reasons were used.
The State also cites Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). In that case,
the Court affirmed a search that was based on a tip from an estranged wife that she
had seen illegal drugs inside the home. Id. at 329.

However, the police in

McArthur had the opportunity to speak to the estranged wife and make a rough
assessment of her reliability. They knew she had had a firsthand opportunity to
observe her husband's behavior, in particular with respect to the drugs at issue. The
police also had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, McArthur would destroy
the drugs before they could return with a warrant.
These cases can be distinguished from Roybal for three reasons. First, the
girlfriend/ex-wife in the above cases were spoken to by the officers and provided
more specific information regarding illegal activity providing an objective reason
for arrest. Second, there was a fear of losing evidence if the tips were not relied
upon. Third, there were allegations of actual criminal offenses observed by the
girlfriend/ex-wife. Here, Annalee never provided the 911 dispatcher with more
specific evidence to support her reliability nor did she speak with an officer or
*22

establish credibility by being more specific to the 911 dispatcher. Furthermore, she
never articulated any evidence of a criminal offense. Finally, the officer followed
Roybal for three blocks and did not observe one traffic violation.
Requiring that the Fourth Amendment be upheld is different than stating in
certain circumstances a family or friend providing a tip may need more support to
be a credible and reliable informant. Ex-wives, girlfriends, boyfriends, etc. are still
encouraged to call and provide tips, but a showing of reliability is necessary before
violating an individual's rights to liberty.
The State expresses fear that if a family or close-friend is not deemed a
reliable informant, they will be deterred from reporting crimes, especially those of
domestic violence or abuse. (Brief Pet. pg. 24). However, requiring corroborating
evidence or more detail from an informant does not prohibit nor deter individuals
to call and report abuse, rather dispatchers are showing that they are taking the
claim more seriously. Recognizing these factors courts in other jurisdiction have
held that "a girlfriend's tip was unreliable because it was offered in the midst of a
quarrel with defendant." State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502 (Tenn. 2006) or that a
close personal relationship might create a motive to lie or exaggerate. State v.
Lindquist, 205 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 1973).
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B.

Exigency of 911 calls does not make a source more reliable
In analyzing the sufficiency of the 911 call, if the investigating officer

cannot provide independent or corroborating information through his or her own
observations, the legality of a stop based on information imparted by another will
depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the individual
originating the information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon by
the investigating officer. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 -1278 (Utah
App.,1994) See *1278 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct at 682; State v. Seel,
827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the Court stated
reasonable suspicion standard "balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on
personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion." Id. Thus, allowing 911 calls to be generally considered as
reliable. In United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002), the Court
stated that "such calls are distinctive in that they concern contemporaneous
emergency events, not general criminal behavior. Additionally, the exigencies of
emergency situations often limit the ability of a caller to convey extraneous details,
such as identifying information ." Id.

Not an issue in the case at bar, since Roybal had clearly left the premises when
the 911 call was made.
# #«
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In United States v. Holloway, a police officer had received a dispatch from a
911 operator relaying a report of gunshots and arguing at appellant's address, and
then received a second similar dispatch. Upon arrival, nothing at the home
dissuaded officers from believing the veracity of the 911 calls, instead the presence
of the appellant and his wife on the porch supported the information. The police
reasonably believed an emergency situation justified a warrantless search of the
home for victims of gunfire. The court held the 911 call and the personal
observations of the officers established probable cause to believe a person located
at the residence was in danger. (Citing cases such as Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), holding that people could well die in emergencies if
police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.
Id.)
However, in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the Court held that an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to
justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. Id. In that case the officer's
suspicion that J.L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations
but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The
Court further held the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide
reasonable suspicion, and it provided no predictive information and therefore left
the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. Id.
# #«
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The present case is almost identical to Florida v. J.L. in that the officer's
suspicion arose from a 911 call rather than Sergeant Ledford's own observations.
The call from Annalee lacked sufficient indicia of reliability as well as lacked an
articulated claim of any criminal offense to provide reasonable suspicion that
defendant was committing any criminal activity.
Here, the State is arguing that the nature of a 911 call is that of an
emergency and should be treated as an "exigent circumstance" requiring more of
an assumption of reliability and less confirmation. However, even applying an
exigent circumstance rationale, Officer Ledford and the 911 dispatcher had no
reason to believe someone would be in danger or that something would be
destroyed if they took the time to confirm the reliability of the 911 call. Annalee
told the 911 dispatcher that Defendant had "just about" assaulted her, but upon
further inquiry that he had not assaulted her, and that the Defendant had left the
premise. R. 96:1. The officer and the 911 dispatcher were aware that Annalee was
not in immediate danger, and the dispatcher could have asked Annalee for more
information regarding the Defendant and his condition. Further, Sergeant Ledford
did not observe Defendant driving in a harmful or offensive manner. In fact,
Sergeant Ledford testified that Defendant was driving slow and cautiously, but not
illegally.

& £; #
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In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 -1278 (Utah App.,1994), the Court
stated that the State failed to establish the department's reasonable, articulable
suspicion to issue the "possible car prowl" bulletin to officers on duty. Stating
"We are left to speculate as to...what did the citizen say? Did the dispatcher
interpret the report? If so, in what manner? Did a supervising officer direct that
the investigation be made based on a pattern of similar activity in the area? If so,
what were the sources of the supervisor's information? Merely providing
descriptive information to an officer about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to
justify the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a
stop was to be made.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Sergeant Ledford did not have a
reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed domestic violence. Roybal,
2008 UT App 286. Domestic violence calls present a unique problem for law
enforcement. Such disputes are "combustible" by nature and often "present a very
real danger of physical injury." United States v. Lawrence, 236 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.
Neb. 2002) In the instant case, the confrontation was "nonphysical;" and though
domestic violence can occur without a physical blow, in the instant case the claims
were not supported by way of police observation or victim testimony and therefore
no domestic violence occurred.

# # «

27

In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (UT App. 1993), a telephone call by the
defendant's former wife was made to the police department stating the defendant
was in the back seat of a brown Oldsmobile, he was accompanied by another
woman, he was on parole for armed robbery, he was using cocaine, and he had
been involved in domestic disturbance. Based on that information, Officer
Yurgelon responded to the call. Officer Yurgelon testified that he stopped the
defendant because he had suspicion defendant had violated his parole and had been
involved in a domestic disturbance. Officer Yurgelon stated that defendant gave
"no indication that he was armed" and defendant complied to the officers request
to separate himself from the female. Even so, Officer Yurgelon proceeded to frisk
the defendant. Upon a frisk, he found a syringe.
The Court determining whether a report of domestic violence would
automatically place a frisk of the suspect within the ambit of Utah's frisk statute,
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16, the Court concluded that any "immediate concern the
officers might have felt for the defendant's female companion should have
diminished when defendant separated himself from this companion by following
police instructions and getting out of the car. At that point, any residual concern
the officers harbored would have been completely dispelled by asking the
companion if she were in distress and inquiring whether she were, in fact, involved
in the earlier incident." Id. The White court held that an automatic frisk was not
# # €
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appropriate under the circumstances and that the officer lacked a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot.
In U.S. v. Sikut, 488 F.Supp.2d 291, 307 -308 (W.D.N.Y.,2007), the Second
Circuit has recognized the "combustible nature of domestic disputes/' which
provides "great latitude to an officer's belief that warrantless entry was justified by
exigent circumstances when the officer had substantial reason to believe that one
of the parties to the dispute was in danger." However, once the officers investigate,
... under the Fourth Amendment, the officers' authority to remain on
the premises without a warrant ended when they determined no one in
the apartment required assistance, and they realized, or objectively
should have realized, they had no reasonable grounds to suspect Sikut
was either a burglar or a trespasser...(U.S. v. Sikut 488 F.Supp.2d
291, 313 (W.D.N.Y.,2007))

Furthermore, courts have held that domestic violence situations are not per
se exigent, United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 719 (10th Cir.2006), cert denied,
— U.S. — , 127 S.Ct. 542, 166 L.Ed.2d 401 (2006).
Similarly, Sergeant Ledford's concern for Annalee should have been
dispelled when he determined that Roybal had left Annalee's premise and was no
longer near her. This fact was cemented once Sergeant Ledford discovered Roybal
1.5 miles from the residence. Further, when Annalee called 911, she stated that
Roybal "just about" assaulted her. She made no further statements that would
indicate he had tried and missed, nor did she make statements that she was in
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immediate fear or danger. Instead she told the 911 dispatcher to "get over here
quick" and that "I don't even give a s—, I just want him out." R. 96:2. These types
of statements expressed more anger than fear, and the 911 dispatcher even told
Annalee to calm down by "taking deep breaths.". R. 96:2. Here, there was little
risk domestic violence had happened or was about to happen. Sergeant Ledford did
nothing to provide himself of objectively reasonable facts that would support a
domestic violence claim.
The 911 call was placed by an intoxicated and upset girlfriend who was not
in "immediate and deadly threat of harm." Additionally, the information provided
by the 911 caller in the instant case was not unambiguously indicative of a recent
domestic dispute involving personal violence. Rather, the 911 caller stated that
Defendant "just about" committed some action, and upon inquiry that he had in
fact not committed an assault. R. 97:2.
In an article featured on MSNBC (Alex Johnson), 911 that "as many as 45
percent of the more than 8 million cell phone calls to 911 each year are for nonemergencies, officials said; in Sacramento, it could be as high as 80 percent. Those
calls block the lines for callers who really need urgent help." With statistics and
the frequency of 911 calls for emergencies, non-emergencies, and pranks, it is
essential for 911 dispatchers to ask enough questions to make a tip or informant
coming through a 911 call more reliable.
#•
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In a similar Utah study, a 2005 report issued by Governor Huntsman on
Domestic Violence, statistics showed that of over 6,000 supported allegations of
domestic abuse (child), only 60% of those resulted in actual identifiable acts of
domestic violence. (Governor's report of 2007 and of 2005.) This statistic and
many others indicate that calls are made and police respond to a number of nonthreatening calls. Requiring more information from informants will not result in a
policy break down of the seriousness of domestic violence, rather will encourage
individuals who need assistance to call and will discourage individuals who may
call just out of spite knowing they have no supporting evidence. Objective reasons
for making an arrest are fundamental to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system and society.
It is necessary that in justifying a particular intrusion, the 911 dispatcher
should ask callers for more information relating to the allegations when the
situation requires and time permits. Police officers must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion. Such a rule saves valuable police resources as
well as preserves the constitutional rights of the citizens. The fact that the tip is
from a 911 call does not make it inherently reliable. This Court should accordingly
sustain the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Sergeant Ledford did not have
reasonable suspicion to support the stop.
%•
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ISSUE II:
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ANALYZED THIS
CASE AND LOOKED AT THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DECIDING THAT OFFICER
LEDFORD DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION
THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE.
"[I]t is settled law that 'a police officer may detain and question an
individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person
has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.' " State v. Markland,
2005 UT 26, | 10, 112 P.3d 507. Under the reasonable suspicion standard, "the
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence
standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d
740 (2002). When determining whether police officers had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion, courts may not use a "divide-and-conquer analysis." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In other words, courts
cannot evaluate individual facts in isolation to determine whether each fact has an
innocent explanation. United States v. Annzu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744,
151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Rather courts must look to the "totality of the
circumstances" to determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further
investigation by the police officer. Id. This analysis cuts both ways. An officer
cannot look at one weak allegation of questionable criminal conduct and throw out
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other indications of law-abiding behavior that tend to discount or raise suspicions
of the weak allegation.
An officer's suspicion is reasonable if it is supported by specific and
articulable facts as well as any rational inferences drawn from those facts. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. However, an "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch,' " is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. State v.
Alverez, 147 P.3d 425, 432 (Utah,2006) An arresting officer's state of mind is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.
The State in the instant case claims that the Court of Appeals wrongfully
applied and used a divide-and-conquer analysis. The State cites the case Alverez in
which this Court stressed that the Constitution "does not prevent police from using
tips without any indicia of reliability if, in addition to such tips, the officer's own
observations give the officer reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id. The State
further cites this Court in State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, 112 P.3d 507, held
officers "should not have been expected or required to completely ignore the
suspicious backdrop provided by the dispatch report with investigation." Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court have held
that when applying the totality of the circumstances analysis, a police officer may,
in certain circumstances, rely on information received from another; however, "the
legality of a stop based on information imparted by another will depend on the
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33

sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the individual originating the
information." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct.App.1994); In other
words, the tip must bear some indicia of reliability. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). Further, in Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court states that "our cases make clear that
an arresting officer's state of mind (except facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the
existence of probable cause." Id. Using a totality of the circumstances analysis, it is
still important to examine the reliability of the informant's tip, a 911 call or other
information to make sure it satisfies an objective reasonable suspicion standard. Id.
In State v. Case, the officers received two tips. Officer Wahlin described one
tip as his "ha[ving] heard there was dealings in this area." The other tip, about
defendant's vehicle, came from the police department's narcotics division. The
record does not disclose whether the narcotics division was able to provide any
background information about the origin or trustworthiness of its report. Because
the origin of the tips relied on by the officers is unknown, neither tip bears any
external indicia of reliability, which is troubling. Indeed, the State has conceded
that the tips alone were insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion.
The current case is almost identical to State v. Case. Here, Sergeant Ledford
relied on a tip that did not bear external indicia of reliability, and his observations
of the defendant "slowing and making right turns" is not sufficient by itself to
# # €
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justify a stop. To the contrary, the following and critical examination of Roybal's
driving for almost four (4) blocks with no traffic violation points to the
unreliability of the questionable tip. Applying a totality of the circumstances
analysis, the information given to Sergeant Ledford and his own observations falls
short of establishing an objective reasonable suspicion for stopping the Defendant
for driving while intoxicated. No specific details were given to Sergeant Ledford
about the amount of alcohol that had been consumed, in fact the only information
given to the 911 dispatcher was that the Defendant "had been drinking,55 when the
Defendant drank, what type of alcohol he consumed or the amount was never
given or mentioned by Annalee.
In addition to the tip being unreliable, Sergeant Ledford5s own observations
were insufficient to warrant a stop. Sergeant Ledford stated he observed Defendant
driving slowly and trying to stay behind the officer and made three right turns.
However, this type of behavior could be consistent with other situations such as an
individual being lost in a neighborhood trying to find an address, old age, public
perception of fear of police officers and traffic tickets or more likely, just cautious
and proper driving, the type that should be encouraged, not criticized. Defendant
was not doing anything illegal; and therefore relying on Sergeant Ledford5s
experience and observations alone, did not support the stop.
In State v. Dorsey 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah,1986) this Court held:
%• #
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The probable cause requirement is subject to a narrow exception for
stops of moving vehicles where police officers have an articulable
suspicion that the automobile's occupants are "involved in criminal
activity.

It is important to make it a reasoned and logical examination of the facts available
to Sergeant Ledford in determining whether or not there was reasonable articulable
suspicion that the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Defendant
agrees that utilizing a totality of the circumstances modality in making this
assessment is necessary.
Utah as well as the U.S. Supreme Court have stated that "[E]venhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct,
rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer."
Id. "In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be abk 10 point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. "It is
necessary that the facts available to the officer would cause a person of "reasonable
caution" to believe that the intrusion was necessary." Id at 21.
Courts have further held that tips can still be considered, along with other
factors, in a totality of the circumstances analysis. In Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266,
1278 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct. at 682. the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of a Florida state court to suppress evidence that was
#

m &.

36

obtained from a juvenile defendant where the police officers' suspicions "arose not
from any observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown
location by an unknown caller." Id. at 270. The Court further stated that it does not
prevent police officers from using tips without any indicia of reliability if, in
addition to such tips, the officer's own observations give the officer a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity. Id.
This Court in State v. Alverez, 2006 UT , 147 P.3d 425, held that where two
officers observed suspicious objects in the defendant's car, along with their
inference the officers drew as a result of their experience, strengthen the
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion when considered in the context of the tips.
Additionally, this Court held that notwithstanding the conclusion that there was
reasonable suspicion, they note this was a close case. The totality of the facts
barely meets the threshold of reasonable and articulable suspicion. "We thus
emphasize that it is only because of the sum of all the available facts that we affirm
the Court of Appeals' decision. The absence of any one of the facts could well have
dictated a different conclusion. We also point out that the officers in this case could
have done many things to shore up their suspicions about Defendant before
detaining him. For example, they could have verified the tips they had received,
followed Defendant from the condominium complex to do further surveillance of
his activities, inquired as to what apartment he had visited, and asked whether he
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was the owner of the vehicle. Any of these would likely have provided more
substantial probable cause to justify obtaining a warrant for Defendant's person.
This decision is not intended to give police officers permission to "seize now, ask
questions later" without first conducting an adequate investigation." Id.
Applying this objective totality of circumstances analysis to the case at bar,
it is clear that Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a
constitutionally permissible stop and seizure. As previously discussed, the 911 call
did not establish that a criminal violation had occurred. At best we have an upset
girlfriend who wants the Defendant harassed.

There were no allegations of

criminal activity. Sergeant Ledford testified that he, after receiving the dispatch
notice, located the Defendant's car. He followed the vehicle for over three blocks
and a total of three turns specifically looking for any traffic violation, and he
observed none. He was only able to testify that the Defendant was driving slowly
and committed no traffic offenses.
Several conflicts in Sergeant Ledford's testimony cause concern.

First,

Sergeant Ledford testified that he was traveling eastbound on 30th Street heading
toward Annalee's house. A review of the Google map of that area would indicate
that a driver traveling eastbound on 30th Street would be traveling away from the
residence. Sergeant Ledford's testimony changed from the preliminary hearing
where he testified the Defendant was driving at approximately 25 miles an hour to
# #«
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the suppression hearing, where he testified the defendant was driving 5 miles an
hour.

There is absolutely no explanation for this 500% discrepancy in his

estimating abilities. The State, in attempting to support the stop, cites a NHTSA
study that claims there is a good chance the driver is DWI if a driver is driving 10+
mph under the limit. (App. Brief pg. 42). Where there is a 500% discrepancy in
Sergeant Ledford's estimating abilities, it seems incredible that is the State would
ask this Court to rely upon those estimations of speed to justify a seizure.
Furthermore, what the State fails to mention is that the defendant was first
observed at a stop sign and then drove for a distance of only one block before
making a right hand turn. This was repeated on three consecutive blocks and three
consecutive stops and right-hand turns. It is highly doubtful that anyone would
reach a posted speed limit of 35 mph or 40 mph starting from a dead stop, turning
right, and then slowing in anticipation of another right-hand turn. If the Defendant
had reached 40 mph in that situation he probably would have been cited for
reckless driving.
Given the totality of those facts, a reasonable, objective person would not
have believed a stop to be warranted. Sergeant Ledford did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant because no violation of the law was occurring and the
Appellate Court properly analyzed the information and tips under the totality of the
circumstances and correctly concluded the stop was illegal.
# # ^
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CONCLUSION

The Defendant believes that an objective review of all of the information
available or discerned by Sergeant Ledford simply does not support a reasonable
suspicion that the Defendant had committed a crime of domestic violence.
Furthermore, an objective review of the information given to or discerned by
Sergeant Ledford does not support a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was
driving under the influence of alcohol.

The Defendant therefore respectfully

requests this Court suppress the evidence obtained by an unconstitutional seizure
and affirm the Court of Appeals decision.
Respectfully submitted April 13, 2009.,
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Directions to 1150 Patterson St,
Ogden, Weber, Utah 84403
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Directions to 1150 Pattersc

°3den> Weber? utah 84403

Save trees. Go green!//
Download Google Maps on your
phone at googie.com/gmm A^--m

3865 Quincy Ave, Ogden, UT 84403
1. Head north on 900 E/Quincy Ave toward 3800 S/3875 S/Grandview Dr
Continue to follow Quincy Ave

go 0.4 mi
iota! 0.4 mi

About 1 min

2. Turn right at 36th St
About 1 min

3. Turn left at Van Buren Ave
About2mins

4. Continue on 32nd St

go 0.3 mi
total 0.6 mi

go 0.5 mi
total 1.2 mi

go 440 ft
total 1.3 ml

*l

5. Turn left at Brinker Ave
About 1 min

go 0.2 mi
total 1.5 mi

| 1150 Patterson St, Ogden, Weber, Utah 84403

These directions are for planning purposes only, You may find that construction projects, traffic, weather, or
other events may cause conditions to differ from the map results, and you shouid pian your route accordingly.
You must obey all signs or notices regarding your route.
Map data ©2009 . Tele Atlas
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
JUL 2 5 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appeilee;

)
)
)

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

)
)
)

Jose Baltarcar Rovbal,

Case No. 20060911-CA
F I L E D
(July 25, 2 008)

)
)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

:2008 UT App 28(

Second District, Ogden Department, 051904214
The Honorable Parley R. Baldwin
Attorneys:

Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges T h o m e , Davis, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
%1
Defendant Jose Baltarcar Roybal appeals the trial
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We conclude that the
appeal is well-taken, reverse the denial of the motion to
suppress, and remand for a new trial.
BACKGROUND1
%2
Roybal's live-in girlfriend called 911 and reported a
domestic dispute. She identified herself and stated that Roybal
1. The trial court made some oral factual findings and
conclusions of law after the April 18, 2006, evidentiary hearing,
but it never entered formal factual findings and conclusions of
law. Our recitation of the facts, therefore, is based on the
trial court's oral findings and on evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing that supports those findings.
We have jurisdiction to consider the suppression issue
because the trial court's sentence of Roybal I! constitutes a final
order from which he may appeal." State v. Norris, 2002 UT App
305, % 8, 57 P.3d 238 (determining that the Utah Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the trial court's
denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, even
though the trial court only orally denied the motion, because the
"sentence constitute[d] a final order") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

had l! [] Just about" assaulted her and chat she wanted him out of
the nouse. The dispatch operator asked her if Roybal had been
drinking, and she replied that they both had been drinking. She
gave no additional information about the quantity or type of
alcohol Roybal had consumed or the time period during which he
had been drinking. She then told the dispatch operator that
Roybal was leaving in a white 1985 GMC van. She also gave the
dispatcher Roybal's name, stated that he was fifty-nine and
Hispanic, identified the. first three letters of the van's license
plate, and indicated that he was heading south on Quincy Avenue.
%2
The dispatch center informed Sergeant Ledford of the call,
stating thau the suspect was "very intoxicated," and Sergeant
Ledford started heading toward the house. En route, he saw the
described van." He testified that the driver was driving in a
manner that indicated he might be intoxicated--he was driving
with "slow deliberate movements" and seemed to be trying to avoid
Sergeant Ledford. Sergeant Ledford further testified that he
followed Roybal long enough to ascertain he was driving in a
circular pattern, near the 911 caller's residence. The trial
court found that it "was not a circle pattern, but a right-turn
pattern." Nonetheless, this driving pattern concerned Sergeant
Ledford because, in his experience, people leaving the scene
after domestic disputes often drive around the area, waiting to
see if the police are going to arrive, before returning to the
scene.
^4
After following Roybal for a fewr blocks, Sergeant Ledford
noticed that Roybal was driving below the speed limit, but
Sergeant Ledford did not observe any traffic violations.3
Sergeant Ledford pulled Roybal over. Sergeant Ledford later
testified that he "smell[ed] the odor of alcohol coming from
inside the van." Once Roybal exited the van, Sergeant Ledford
smelled alcohol on Roybal's breath. Roybal admitted that he had
been drinking, and he failed a field sobriety test. Sergeant
Ledford arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol.
This prosecution followed.

2. Sergeant Ledford also testified that after he stopped the
van, he confirmed that the driver matched the physical
description given.
3. Generally, a person is considered to commit a traffic
violation for driving too slowly only if he or she "impede [s] or
block[s] the normal and reasonable movement of traffic" without a
legitimate reason for doing so. Utah Code Ann, § 4i-6a-605(l)
(2005). The trial court determined that while Roybal was driving
slowly, he was not driving in an improper manner or violating the
law.
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f5
Roybal moved to ,![s]uppress any and all [ejvidence in the
. . . case" because "there [was] insufficient reasonable
articulable suspicion • . . . t o initiate [the] motor vehicle
stop." A couple of days after the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court orally denied Roybal's motion to suppress, concluding that
the girlfriend's statement that Roybal had been drinking provided
justification for the traffic stop. Roybal later entered a nocontest plea to driving under the influence of alcohol, see Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(l) (2005), a third-degree felony in this
case, see id. § 41-6a-503(2) (b) (Supp. 2007), reserving his right
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He
now appeals the trial court's suppression decision.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
%6
Roybal argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because Sergeant Ledford violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by initiating the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion that Roybal was committing a crime. In an
appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, "we review the trial court's factual findings for clear
error and we review its conclusions of law for correctness."
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, % 11, 162 P.3d 1106. "In search
and seizure cases, no deference is granted to . . . the [trial]
-court regarding the application of law to underlying factual
findings. " State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, % 8, 147 P.3d 425. See
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15, 103 P.3d 699 ("We abandon the
standard which extended 'some deference' to the application of
law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure
cases in favor of non-deferential review.").
ANALYSIS
%7
Roybal contends that the 911 call did not provide reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop because the call was "received
from a citizen with unknown reliability" and because "the
dispatcher mischaracterized the level of [his] intoxication."
The trial court agreed that the dispatch operator
mischaracterized the girlfriend's report. This conclusion is
inarguable. The girlfriend's statement did not indicate that
Roybal was intoxicated at all, much less "very intoxicated." We
note, however, that the dispatcher's mischaracterization of the
level of intoxication alone does not justify reversal. As long
as the dispatch operator had reasonable suspicion at the time of
the call that a crime was being committed, or was about to be
committed, then the stop, even though effected by a different
officer, would be justified. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
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1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). That oeing said, we agree chat
there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the
traffic stop and therefore reverse.
^J8
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of
traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (Quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968). See also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. An
investigatory stop of a vehicle is a level two encounter, see
State v. Johnson/805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991), that is
constitutional only if (1) "the officer's initial stop [is]
justified" and (2) the officer's "subsequent actions [are] within
the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop,"4 State v.
Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 10, 999 P.2d 7 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted) . "A stop is justified only if there is
a reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal
activity." Id. % 11. An officer "'must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion.'" Id. (quoting Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d
231, 234 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah
1997)). We determine whether an officer had the requisite level
of suspicion by evaluating the totality of the facts and
circumstances. See id.
^|9.
"The specific and articulable facts required to support
reasonable suspicion are most frequently based on an
investigating officer's own observations and inferences, but
under certain circumstances the officer may rely on other sources
of information[,]" including "bulletins, or flyers received from
other law enforcement sources."" State v. Case, 8 84 P. 2d 1274,
1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A police officer's traffic stop
based solely on such other sources is constitutional as long as
"'the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985)) (emphasis in
original).

4. We only address the first of these two elements, as Roybal
does not challenge the officer's actions following the stop.
5. "The term 'flyer[]' . . . has been taken to mean any
information intended to prompt investigation that is transmitted
through police channels, regardless of method." State v. Case,
884 P.2d 1274, 1277 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . The dispatch
report based on the 911 call in this case readily falls within
this definition.

20060911-CA

4

i" 10 "Reasonable suspicion . . . is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability. Both factors--quantity and quality—are considered
in the 'totality of the circumstances ' ,! analysis. Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). We first address the
reliability of the call, then consider the content of the
information the 911 caller gave the dispatch operator, and
finally determine whether Sergeant Ledford's observations alone
justified the stop.
I.

Reliability of the 911 Call

^11 A court considers several factors when determining the
reliability of an informant's tip, including (1) "the type of tip
or informant," Kavsville Citv v.*" Mulcahv, 943 P. 2d 231," 235 (Utah
Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); (2) "whether
the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal
activity to support a stop," id. at 236; and (3) "whether the
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's
report of the informant's tip," id. See Salt Lake City v. Bench,
2 0 08 UT App 30, % 14, 177 P. 3d 655. When a citizen-informant has
some kind of personal involvement with the suspect, the
information conveyed is considered less reliable because there is
a possibility that the citizen is making allegations out of
anger, out of jealousy, or for other personal reasons. See id.
•% 15. This is especially a concern when the informant is a
spouse, former spouse, or significant other who recently had an
argument or confrontation with the suspect, or who otherwise has
a troubled history with the suspect. See id. (citing numerous
cases in support of this proposition).
^112 With regard to the first factor, the 911 caller identified
Roybal as her "[s]ignificant other" and acknowledged they had
just had an argument. She conceded that Roybal had not assaulted
her, although she said he had been about to, and said, even as he
was leaving, that she wanted him out of the house. Given these
circumstances, and the fact, as found by the trial court, that
the caller sounded intoxicated, the dispatch operator should have
been somewhat concerned about the reliability of the information
received.
^j 13 With regard to the second and third reliability factors, the
911 caller did give some details regarding the suspect, the
vehicle he was driving, and the direction in which he was
traveling. While Sergeant Ledford corroborated some of these
details before stopping Roybal, none of these details helped
confirm that Roybal was driving while intoxicated--the criminal
wrongdoing at issue. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1279 (stating that
corroborating details relating to a person's physical description
"is not corroboration of criminal activity, only of physical
characteristics that by themselves have no relevance to criminal
activity"). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)
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("[E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives,
his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing,
along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,
entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the
case."); State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 14, 999 P.2d 7 ("All the
State must introduce is evidence showing the informant's tip was
reliable, provided sufficient detail of criminal activity, and
could be corroborated by police."); State v. Anderson, 701 P. 2d
1099, 1100, 1102 (Utah 1985) ("[T]he reliability of the
informant's information was bolstered by the detail with which
the informant described the proposed [marijuana] enclosure.
Finally, there was verification of the significant facts by the
officer.") (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that
the informant's tip to the 911 operator was of questionable
reliability.
II.

Information Provided in the 911 Call

^| 14 Roybal ' s girlfriend only reported that Roybal had been
drinking without indicating the quantity or type of alcohol he
consumed or for how long he had been drinking. She also did not
provide any information regarding his weight. The trial court,
after listening to the 911 recording, determined that the caller
sounded intoxicated and that it was reasonable to conclude that
both she and Roybal had been drinking. Based on these facts, the
court determined that the stop was justified.
1J15 However, the statement that a person has been drinking, by
itself--with no other facts regarding the amount of alcohol
consumed, the type of beverage consumed, or the period of time
over which the person consumed the alcohol, or the person's
physical size--does not provide an adequate basis on which to
rationally infer that the person has an alcohol level beyond the
legally proscribed limit, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (1) (a),
(c) (2005), or that the person consumed alcohol to the extent
that he or she could not safely drive a vehicle, see id. § 41-6a502(1) (b) . See also State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 10, 112
P.3d 507 ("[TJhe officer's suspicion must be supported by
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences, and
cannot be merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch[.]") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
People frequently drink alcohol without becoming intoxicated.
From the information the caller gave, the dispatch operator knew
that the suspect was a fifty-nine-year-old Hispanic man but had
no information regarding his weight. He could have been threehundred pounds and consumed only two or three light beers over
the course of several hours. If so, two or three light beers
would probably not have affected his ability to safely operate a
vehicle or caused his blood alcohol level to rise above the
proscribed limit. The caller's statements, therefore, provided
no information from which the dispatch operator could reasonably
infer that Roybal--as opposed to the caller--had consumed alcohol
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to one point thac he was committing a crime by driving a vehicle.
Accordingly, we conclude that the information given by the 911
caller did not provide the dispatch operator with reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, and it
therefore did not.provide Sergeant Ledford with such
justification. See Salt hake Citv v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, %%
19-20 & n.4, 177 P.3d 655.
III.

Sergeant Ledford's Own Observations

%1G Finally, we address whether Sergeant Ledford ! s own
observations provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the
stop. Sergeant Ledford did not observe swerving, driving over
the center line, or other unsafe driving patterns from which he
could have reasonably inferred that Roybal was driving while
intoxicated. See State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ^j 10, 173
P.3d 213. Rather, Sergeant Ledford only observed Roybal driving
in a slow, cautious manner. While he testified such driving is
consistent with intoxication, we recently discussed in Salt Lake
Citv v. Bench that cautious driving and endeavoring to avoid a
police encounter do not establish a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a person is driving while intoxicated. See 2008
UT App 30, %% 11-13. See also State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 494
n.ll (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Drivers committing no crimes
whatsoever routinely slow down when they see a police car. It is
human nature to do so and not suggestive of criminality.
CONCLUSION
%11 When considering the totality of the circumstances of this
case — especially that the tip itself was not reliable, that the
content of the information conveyed did not provide reasonable
suspicion, and that Sergeant Ledford5s own observations provided
no information from which he could reasonably suspect that Roybal
was driving while intoxicated--we conclude that there was no
justification for the traffic stop. The trial court
inappropriately denied Roybal's motion to suppress evidence
because the dispatch operator, and therefore Sergeant Ledford,
did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that Roybal was
committing a crime. The information conveyed in the call by
Roybal's live-in girlfriend lacked sufficient reliability because
the caller was potentially biased, apparently inebriated, and did
not provide meaningful detail regarding the crime that was
supposedly being committed. Furthermore, the content of the
information provided did not provide any details that indicated
Roybal was legally intoxicated and committing a crime when he
drove his vehicle. While Sergeant Ledford's own observations did
corroborate some ancillary details provided by the caller, none
of his observations corroborated the essence of the complaint,
i.e., that Roybal was driving while intoxicated. We accordingly
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THORNE', Judge (dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent
I do not agree with the majority
that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify
stop. Rather, I think that the information Roybal ' s
girlfriend conveyed to the 91.1 dispatcher, together with the
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, establish a reasonable
suspicion that Roybal was driving while intoxicated sufficient to
justify the traffic stop on that basis alone. It is true that
the citizen informant in this case identified herself as Roybal's
"[significant other" and acknowledged that they had just had a
heated argument, which may render the information conveyed less
reliable. Nevertheless, the information conveyed should not be
discarded merely on the possibility of bad motive. Courts should
evaluate the specific and articulable facts required to support
reasonable suspicion in their totality, rather than looking at
each fact in isolation. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 23,
164 P.3d 397.
%1

6. The State argues that Sergeant Ledford had an independent
reason to stop Roybal because the 911 caller's statements
indicated that an assault might have occurred. We disagree. In
response to the dispatch operator's first question about whether
she had been assaulted, the caller stated that she had "[j]ust
about" been assaulted. However, when dispatch asked a second
time if she had been assaulted, she clarified that she had not
been. The trial court did not base its ruling on this aspect of
the call, and the facts conveyed by the caller as to her
nonphysical confrontation with Roybal would not support the
traffic stop on the alternative basis urged by the State.
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%20 The totality of the information conveyed to the dispatcher,
including the girlfriend's intoxicated demeanor and statement
that she and Royba 1 had both been drinking, establishes that the
dispatcher had reasonable suspicion that Roybal was driving while
intoxicated. Given these circumstances, and after reviewing the
audio of the 911 call, the trial judge concluded that the
dispatcher could have reasonably inferred that Royhal and his
girlfriend had been drinking together, the girlfriend was
intoxicated, and Roybal, who had just left the house, was in fact
also intoxicated and driving.
5,21 While the girlfriend's unhappy personal relationship with
Roybal may, as with the informant in Salt hake Citv v. Bench,
2008 UT App 30, 177 P.3d 655, call into question her reliability,
see id. flf 14-16, it does not obviate the facts. Unlike the
situation in Bench, the 911 audio demonstrates that Roybal l s
girlfriend was intoxicated. When coupled with the information
that the parties had been drinking together, the dispatcher
possessed sufficient information to reasonably infer that Roybal
was intoxicated. Although Roybal's girlfriend did not provide
the dispatcher with specific information about how much alcohol
Roybal had actually consumed, the dispatcher could reasonably
infer from the girlfriend's statement that the parties had been
drinking together and that the girlfriend had actually witnessed
Roybal drinking. Additionally, the girlfriend's intoxicated
demeanor would also -suggest that Roybal may be intoxicated as
well. Thus, even if the girlfriend had a nonobjective motive,
the dispatcher could reasonably conclude that the facts and
circumstances raised an inference that Roybal was also
intoxicated. This is sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion.
^|22 Based on the entirety of the information available to the
dispatcher, I would conclude that the dispatcher had reasonable
suspicion, despite any reliability issues that may have been
present, sufficient to alert officers of an intoxicated driver.
I would conclude that the traffic stop was permissible and
therefore would affirm the trial court.

William A. Thorne Jr.,
~/
Associate Presiding Judg€
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